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tion of Daniels,20 which involved the investigation of the sole stock-
holder of a corporation which had obtained its charter in Panama and
had never been subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, the
Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was avail-
able to the sole stockholder of the corporation in respect to corporate
books and records. The court there declared that since the corporation
was not within the jurisdiction of the United States, the books and
records of the corporation would be considered as those of an unin-
corporated association and the "group or personal interest" test of the
White case must be applied. And if in applying this test, the corporate
officer was found to hold the books and records in a purely personal
capacity, he must be afforded the constitutional protection of the privi-
lege against compulsory self-incrimination.21
Some text writers feel that the circumstances which prompted the
framing of the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination are no longer present in today's society, and therefore
it should be severely curtailed or abolished completely.2 2 Recent opinions
dealing with tax investigations, by emphasizing the importance of the
visitorial power over the corporation, have substantially diminished the
fifth amendment's protection as to businessmen operating through the
corporation. TERRY R. GRAY
Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure Incident to Arrest for
Traffic Violation: Defendant was stopped by two officers of the
vice squad, narcotics division, and placed under arrest for a brake light
violation. Informed that the violation justified a search of his person
and the car, defendant stated: "Go ahead, I am clean." The search
of the car revealed nothing, but with the aid of a flashlight, the officers
discovered a few particles of marijuana in defendant's overcoat pocket.
Defendant was arrested for possession of narcotics and subsequently
convicted. On appeal, in Barnes v. State,' the Wisconsin Supreme Court
reversed, holding that (1) there was no consent and (2) the search
incident to arrest was unconstitutional.
Determining the issue of consent, Justice Currie stated "that the
consent given was tainted with duress and therefore not freely and
voluntarily given. Not only was defendant then under arrest but he
knew from the statement of the officer that his person would be
searched regardless of whether he consented or not. ' 2
20 140 F. Supp. 322 (S.D. N.Y. 1956).
21 Id. at 326.
22Baker, Is the Privilege an Anachronism? 42 A.B.A.J. 633 (1956) ; Fink,
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination-A Critical Reappraisal, 13 W. REs.
L. REV. 722 (1962) ; Pittman, Fifth Amendment: Yesterday, Today, and
Tonorrow, 42 A.B.A.J. 509 (1956).125 Wis. 2d 116, 130 N.W. 2d 264 (1964).
2 Id. at 123, 130 N.W. 2d 268.
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The ensuing analysis will be directed towards the second issue in
the case; i.e., whether the search incident to the arrest was constitutional.
The court held that
all searches by police officers are subject to the requirement of
reasonableness.... Not only was defendant 'patted down,' but
the officers searched the inside of his overcoat pocket with a
flashlight. We cannot conceive that this aspect of the search was a
legitimate search for weapons. The only reasonable inference to
be drawn from this action was that these vice-squad officers as-
signed to the narcotics division were searching for narcotics.
We reject the state's contention that any search of one lawfully
arrested is a valid search. Such'search to be reasonable must be
limited to weapons or the fruits or the instrumentalities of the
crime for which the defendant was arrested.3
The general rule is that a search incident to a valid arrest is valid.4
But, at this point, mention should be made of the enormous problem
raised in simply attempting to define arrest. No one seems to know just
exactly when an arrest does and does not take place. One author has
carefully delineated between the issuance of a ticket, the issuance of a
summons, and summary arrest and has concluded that any search inci-
dent to a lawful summary arrest is reasonable, but that summary arrest
should be "confined to a limited type of serious cases where a search
would not be considered as offensive as one made incident to a minor
traffic violation." Indeed, even the court in Barnes stated:
The policy of the law, which permits arrest for minor traffic
violations instead of prescribing the issuance of a summons with-
out taking the defendant into custody as the exclusive police
action, might well be reconsidered. However, that lies within the
province of the legislature, not this court.7
It has been stated that "in the absence of an applicable federal
statute the law of the state where an arrest without warrant takes place
determines it's validity,"" but it would appear that Henry v. United
States9 would control here because of the "bleed-through" of the four-
teenth amendment. In that case, it was held that "when the officers
interrupted the two men and restricted their liberty of movement, the
3 Id. at 126, 130 N.W. 2d at 269.
4 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
5 See the careful discussion by Judge Kaufman in United States v. Bonanno,
180 F. Supp. 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
6 Agata, Searches and Seizures Incident to Traffic Violations-A Reply to Pro-fessor Simeone, 7 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1, 9, 38 (1962).
725 Wis. 2d 116, 126, 130 N.W. 2d 264, 269 (1964).
s United States v. DiRe, 332 U.S. 581, 589 (1948); see State v. Phillips, 262
Wis. 303, 308, 55 N.W. 2d 384, 386 (1952), where our court held that "an
arrest is the taking, seizing, or detaining of the person of another, either
by touching or putting hands on him, or by any act which indicates an in-
tention to take him into custody and subject the person arrested to the actual
control and will of the person making the arrest."
9361 U.S. 98 (1959).
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arrest, for purposes of this case, was complete." 10 (Emphasis added.)
Because of the phrase "for the purposes of this case," the pervasiveness
of Henry has been suspect," but presumably our court, disregarding
their previous holding in State v. Phillips,12 held that Barnes was ar-
rested under the Henry definition.
The United States Supreme Court has recently stated that "unques-
tionably, when a person is lawfully arrested, the public have the right,
without a search warrant, to make a contemporaneous search of the
person of the accused for weapons or for the fruits of or implements
used to commit the crime."' 13 A search incident to an arrest extends to
things under the accused's immediate control 4 and, depending on the
circumstances of the case, the place where he is arrested.15 As regards
motor vehicles, "what may be an unreasonable search of a house may
be reasonable in the case of a motorcar."' 6 The reasoning that any
search incident to a traffic violation is constitutional has been best ex-
plained by a court that rejected it: "(1) [A] traffic violation is a mis-
demeanor; (2) a police officer has a right to arrest when a misdemeanor
is committed in his presence; (3) an arresting officer has the right to
search the person of one whom he arrests." 1 7
To best understand the recent group of cases that Barnes now
joins' s and the reason for the present interest in this area of search
and seizure, it is necessary to discuss the dilemma in which the police
have found themselves because of the mandate in Mapp v. Ohio.1 Prior
to the imposition of the exclusionary rule on the states by Mapp, those
states not adhering to the rule were not burdened with the necessity
of justifying their searches. 20 With the appellate courts now being
forced to determine the reasonableness of the searches, the police un-
derstandably turned to the ideal justification-make the search incident
to a traffic arrest. However, the possibility of abuse in this fringe area,
which constitutes a narrowly construed exception to the rigid require-
10 Id. at 103.
11 See United States v. Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
"2-262 Wis. 303, 55 N.W. 2d 384 (1952). See also State v. Sullivan, 395 P. 2d
745 (Wash. 1964) and United States v. Boston, 330 F. 2d 937 (2d Cir. 1964).
13 Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964).
14 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
'5 Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
16 Preston v. United States, supra note 13, citing Carroll v. United States, supra
note 14. See also Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1913) ; and Com-
monwealth v. Katz, 202 Pa. Super 629, 198 A. 2d 883 (1964).
1" People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11, 166 N.E. 2d 433, 436 (1960).
1s People v. Watkins, 19 Il1. 2d 11, 166 N.E. 2d 433 (1960) ; People v. Mayo, 19
Ill. 2d 136, 166 N.E. 2d 440 (1960) ; People v. Gonzales, 356 Mich. 247, 97
N.W. 2d 16 (1959) ; People v. Zeigler, 358 Mich. 355, 100 N.W. 2d 456 (1960) ;
State v. Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d 638, 374 P. 2d 989 (1962) ; State v. Harris,
265 Minn. 260, 121 N.W. 2d 327 (1963).
19 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
20 But see People v. Gonzales, supra note 18, where the court held that the search
was unreasonable even though the evidence was admissible because the court
was not bound by the exclusionary rule.
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ment of a search warrant,21 is patent; in fact, it has been judicially
recognized that it is virtually impossible today to drive an automobile
on the road without violating some sort of traffic law or ordinance.22
While one must sympathize with the police in the fact that one of their
most effective methods of law enforcement and crime detection has
been suddenly and rudely thrown into a state of confusion and un-
certainty,23 the fact remains that a search violating the fourth amend-
ment is not constitutional.
It appears that only two cases have gone to the fullest extent pos-
sible and held that a traffic arrest will not make a search incident to
an arrest ipso facto reasonable.2 4 Without drawing any distinction
between the person and the automobile, the court in People v. Gonzales25
held that "since no further detention was contemplated, there was no
need to search for weapons or other means of possible escape from
custody. '2 In People v. Watkils 27 it was said that "when no more is
shown than that a car was parked too close to a crosswalk or too far
from a curb, the constitution does not permit a policeman to search
the driver." 28 Other states, taking judicial notice of the numerous at-
tacks which have been made on law enforcement officers seeking to
interrogate occupants of automobiles, hold that even though there are
no fruits or instrumentalities flowing from the traffic violation, the
officer at least has the right to search for weapons. 29
The salient feature of these recent cases is the obvious shift of the
emphasis of the court. Heretofore, the courts had looked merely to the
validity of the arrest; now they seem to be looking at the incidentalness
21 In Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958), it was stated that "the
exceptions to the rule that a search must rest upon a search warrant have
been jealously and carefully drawn, and search incident to a valid arrest is
among them."
22 Brinegar v. State, 97 Okla. Crim. 299, 262 P. 2d 464 (1953).
23 See the dissent in People v. Zeigler, supra note 18, 100 N.W. 2d at 467, where
Justice Smith said: "At the extreme, it is clear that search made solely upon
caprice is not reasonably justified by the circumstances. Yet, at the other
extreme, we will not demand of the officer that he weigh the circumstances
confronting him with the detachment and precision of a laboratory technician
while the seconds may be ticking away his span of life. No more is required
of him than that he act with the prudence and reason demanded of any re-
sponsible official in the conduct of his duties, in the light of the surrounding
circumstances." Also, Judge Learned Hand's statement in In re Fried, 161 F.
2d 453, 465 (2d Cir. 1947), is particularly apposite: "The protection of the
individual from oppression and abuse by the police and enforcing officers is
indeed a major interest in a free society; but so is the effective prosecution
of crime, an interest which at times seems to be forgotten. Perfection is im-
possible; like other human institutions criminal proceedings must be a com-
promise."
24 People v. Watkins, supra note 18; People v. Gonzales, supra note 18.
25 See note 18 supra.
26 Id., 97 N.W. 2d at 20.
27 See note 18 supra.281d., 166 N.E. 2d at 437.
29 See Brook v. State, 21 Wis. 2d 32, 123 N.W. 2d 535 (1963), where a police
officer was killed by the driver of a car stopped because of a loose license
plate. The officer was not aware that the driver had just completed a burglary.
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of the search and judicially recognizing that while it may be perfectly
reasonable to search the person and automobile of one arrested for
drunken driving on the theory that the search might disclose the in-
toxicant, it is quite unreasonable to search the person and automobile
of one arrested for driving with a defective brake light. Clearly, then,
the courts in Barnes viewed the arrest as merely a subterfuge and the
law is well settled that "an arrest may not be used as a pretext to search
for evidence." 30 But how do you preclude this conduct and still retain
incidental searches? The test remains one of reasonableness,3 1 only now
a search is reasonable only to the extent that it was made necessary by
the arrest.3 2 The court in Barnes is in effect asking three questions of
the searching officer:
(1) What were you looking for?
(2) Why were you looking for it there?
(3) Why were you looking for it in that manner?
These three questions all concern the basic thing the court is now con-
cerned with-the relationship of the search to the arrest.
However, there are several instances where the traffic officer is not
precluded from conducting a search. Even though a search may not
always be incident to an arrest, a search of the vehicle can be based
on probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the vehicle
contains contraband.3 3 Thus, in Watkins, where the defendant was ar-
rested for the seemingly inconsequential violation of parking too near
a crosswalk, the police had probable cause to search because (1) they
knew defendant, (2) defendant knew them, (3) he had been arrested
on several previous occasions, and (4) he ran when he saw the police
giving his car a ticket.3 4
Another assuagement, as far as the police are concerned, to the
traffic violation situation is that anything seized that is in plain view
of the officer is not taken pursuant to a search and may give the officer
probable cause to arrest and search further.35 Thus, where defendant
was stopped by the police for speeding and the officer observed a rifle
lying on the back seat, the court held that the police had probable cause
to arrest for a game violation. The stolen money and buglarious tools
30United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932). See also Taglavore v.
United States, 291 F. 2d 262 (9th Cir. 1961).
31 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
32 See Note, Search and Seizure Incident to Arrest for Traffic Violations, 14
HASTINGs L. J. 459 (1963).
33 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Husty v. United States, 282
U.S. 694 (1931).
34 See State v. Quintana, 92 Ariz. 267, 376 P. 2d 130 (1962), where the court
upheld a search of defendant's person after he was stopped for speeding.
Since his "entire decorum was that of nervousness," the court held that the
police were justified in having a reasonable suspicion that the car was stolen
and thus could search his person for weapons.
35 State v. Krogness, 388 P. 2d 120 (Ore. 1963).
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subsequently uncovered in the search of the car were incident to a valid
arrest. 36 As simple as these two concepts appear to be on their face,
they will most likely be the key issues on which many of the traffic
violation searches will now turn.
Since the court now examines the incidentalness of the arrest, one
question that immediately presents itself is how far the holding in
Barnes can be logically extended. Surely there are many arrests that
would not justify a search of the person; e.g., arrests for stock fraud,
income tax evasion, driving without the consent of the owner, adultery,
or lewd and lascivious behavior. This is just one of many ramifications
of Barnes v. State that-our court will have to grapple with in the near
future.
In conclusion, then, the inquiry in Barnes suggests two problems.
The first of these is whether there are only certain types of violations
to which a search is constitutionally incidental. The second, closely
related to the first, is whether there are only certain types of objects
that can be seized in the search. The court in Barnes seems to have
answered both of these questions. The court suggests that weapons
may be the appropriate objects of a search, but that the search must
be limited to places where weapons might be accessible to the person
arrested. However, save a search for weapons, the officer may search
only for the fruits of the crime or instrumentalities. 37 Thus, in Wis-
consin, the "limitations on the fruit to be gathered tend to limit the
quest itself." 38  MICHAEL W. WILCOX
36 Ibid.
3TThus our court appears to adopt the rule that objects of mere evidentiary
value may not be seized; see Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921) ;
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885) ; Morrison v. United States, 263
F. 2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Williams v. United States, 263 F. 2d 487 (D.C.
Cir. 1959) ; Annot., 129 A.L.R. 1296, 1300-01 (1940) ; and Shellow, The Con-
tinuing Vitality of the Gouled Rule: The Search for and Seizure of Evi-
dence, 48 MARQ. L. REv. 172 (1964). Under this distinction, only four types
of objects can be seized: (1) means or instrumentalities by which the crime
was committed, (2) the fruits of the crime, (3) weapons, and (4) contra-
band. FED. R. CRii. P. 41(b). In the recent case of Brown v. State, 24 Wis.
2d 491, 502, 129 N.W. 2d 175, 180 (1964), the court said that "the police may,
without a warrant, conduct a search of the person in order to protect them-
selves, and they may also search premises immediately under his control if
there is also probable cause to believe the search will reveal evidence and
instrumentalities of the crime for which the arrest was made." (Emphasis
added; footnotes omitted.) Query, does Barnes sub silentio overrule Brown?3sUnited States v. Poller, 43 F. 2D 911, 914 (2nd Cir. 1930). Other useful law
review articles in this general area are: Note, Search and Seizure-Search
Incident to Arrest for Traffic Violation, 1959 Wis. L. RaV. 347; Note, Searches
and Seizures Incident to Arrests for Minor Traffic Violations in Illinois, 1960
U. ILL. L. F. 440; 6 WAYNE L. REv. 413 (1960); Simeone, Search and Seizure
Incident to Traffic Violations, 6 ST. Louis U. L. J. 506 (1961); 9 BUFFALO
L. REv. 382 (1960); Collins, Toward Workable Rules of Search and Seizure
-An Ainicus Curiae Brief, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 421 (1962) ; and Rothblatt, The
Arrest: Probable Cause and Search Without a Search Warrant, 35 Miss. L. J.
252 (1964).
